WIPO negotiations culminated in the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 5 The adopted treaty texts rejected or diluted some of the most highly protectionist provisions of the White Paper (Litman, 2001, pp. 129-30) , 6 includingtheproposedprohibitionsrelatingtocircumventiondevicesorservices.Butkey provisions introduced new protection for digital works in the form of legal protection against thecircumventionofTPMs. 7 However,thefinaltextoftheanti-circumventionprovisioninthe WCT-whichisparalleledinArticle18oftheWPPT 8 -divergessignificantlyfromtheoriginalUS proposalandinsteadreflectsaninternationalcompromise:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remediesagainstthecircumventionofeffectivetechnologicalmeasuresthatare usedbyauthorsinconnectionwiththeexerciseoftheirrightsunderthisTreaty ortheBerneConventionandthatrestrictacts,inrespectoftheirworks,which arenotauthorizedbytheauthorsconcernedorpermittedbylaw(WCT,Article 11). Article 11 of the WCT leaves member states with significant latitude when it comes to implementingthetreatyobligationindomesticlaw.First,theTreatyrequiresonly"adequate" legal protection and "effective" legal remedies, leaving room for domestic legislatures to determinewhatisrequiredoftheirlawsinordertomeetthissubjectivestandard.Indeed,the Treatydoesnotrequireanti-circumventionprovisionstobeincludedincopyrightlegislationat all;if"adequate"protectionandremediesareavailablethroughotherlegalroutes,thenArticle 11willbesatisfied (Samuelson,1996) . 9 AsMichaelGeistexplains,"anynationallegislationwill bemeasuredagainstanadequacycriterionsuchthatthelegalprotectionsmustprovidesome measure of protection that a reasonable person would perceive as evidencing effectiveness" (Geist, 2005, p. 223) . In this way, the language of Article 11 reflects the ambivalence or uncertainty that surrounded the creation of legal protection for TPMs in the international arena,andevidencesthelevelofgeneralitythatwasnecessarytogarnersufficientsupportfor itsinclusionintheInternetTreaties. Furthermore, as Kerr and his co-authors explain, pursuant to this section, "the only TPMs subjecttolegalprotectionagainstcircumventionarethosethat:(a)areeffective;(b)areused byauthorstoexercisecopyrights;and(c)restrictactsnotauthorizedbyauthorsorpermitted bylaw" (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 citingKoelmanandHelberger,2000,p.171) .Themeaning of"effective"inthiscontextisunclear.ItiswidelyunderstoodtomeanthatineffectiveTPMs (presumablythosethatcanbeeasilyandcheaplycircumvented)maynotdemandthebenefit ofthelegalprotectionsguaranteedbytheTreaty.Whatthismeansinpracticeismurkierstill, asmostifnotallTPMscanbecircumvented-indeedthisistheassumptionbehindthecreation of additional legal protection. The only clear conclusion is that "not every TPM is subject to legalprotection"undertheWCT (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 . Moreimportantforourpurposes,however,arerestrictions(b) that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their copyright-and only to the extentthataTPMisusedtorestrictunauthorizedactsthatthelawdoesnotpermitinrelation to their protected works. Simply put, the protection afforded to TPMs under the treaties appears to coincide with the scope of copyright proper (Koelman, 2000) ; the treaties are concerned specifically with circumvention activities that facilitate copyright infringements (Wiese,2002,p.150) .IfTPMsmustrestrictactsprotectedbycopyrightlawinordertobenefit fromprotectionpursuanttoArticle11,thenitwouldseemtofollowthatthereisnoobligation, under the WCT, for a member state to prohibit circumvention activities that do not result in copyright infringement. According to this reading of Article 11, circumvention of TPMs for lawfullypermittedpurposessuchafairdealingarebeyondthescopeoftheprotectionthatthe Treatyrequires. 10 WiththeWIPOInternetTreaties,TPMprotectionbecamepartofaninternationalstrategyfor tacklingthechallengestocopyrightlawpresentedbydigitaltechnologies.Consequently,anticircumvention legislation has emerged as a prominent component of the domestic copyright reform agenda. As a signatory to the WIPO Internet Treaties, Canada is now faced with the prospect of ratifying the treaties and bringing its laws into compliance with them. It is important to stress, however, that Canada has not yet assumed any international legal obligationbyvirtueofsigningthetreaties.AsHowardKnopfhasevocativelyexplained,signing atreatyistoratificationaboutthesameaswhatdatingistomarriage (Knopf,2008) . 11 Whether ornotCanadaoughttoratifythetreatiesisprimarilyapoliticalquestion,whichputsintoplaya myriad of practical and pragmatic considerations that reach far beyond Canadian copyright policy.Butitisclearenoughatthistimethatallpoliticalindicatorsarepointinginthedirection ofratification,withthegovernmentactivelyworkingtowardsamendmentstotheCopyrightAct that"wouldimplementtherightsandprotectionsfoundinthetreaties." 12 Before we consider preferred approaches to the legal protection of TPMs in Canada, the potentialsignificanceofanti-circumventionprovisionsshouldbesituatedagainstthebackdrop ofCanadiancopyrightpolicyingeneral,andourfairdealingdefenceinparticular.Thefollowing sectionaimstoarticulatetheproblemsposedbyTPMs,andthepotentialofanti-circumvention laws to tip Canada's copyright balance in favour of owners at the expense of users and the public.
to copyright policy assumes that the restriction of the public's use of works through the creation of private rights can further the public's interest in the widespread creation and distribution of works. The limits to these private rights, defined by fair dealing and other exceptions-and circumscribed by the boundaries of the public domain-are therefore essentialtoensurethatthecopyrightsystemdoesnotinadvertentlyundermineitsownends. In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has articulated the purposes of Canadian copyright law, and has acknowledged the inherent tensions that these purposes present, as wellasthevitalrolethatfairdealingandthepublicdomainmustplayinalleviatingthem.In Théberge v Galerie D'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. (Théberge), the Supreme Court identified copyright'spurposeas"abalancebetweenpromotingthepublicinterestintheencouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator." The Court went on to explain, " [t] he proper balance among these and other public policyobjectivesliesnotonlyinrecognizingthecreator'srightsbutingivingdueweighttotheir limitednature.Incrasslyeconomictermsitwouldbeasinefficienttoovercompensateartists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them" (Théberge, perJusticeBinnie, . Ascopyrightlawstrugglestoadjusttotheproliferationofdigitaltechnologies,ownersdemand ever-increasing protection, and legislative reform looms large, these important pronouncementsonthenatureoftheCanadiancopyrightsystemhavecomeatacriticaltime. TheThébergedecisionrepresentedacrucialmomentinCanadiancopyrightpolicy,cementinga vision of copyright as a system intended not only to protect the rights of authors and their assignees, but also (and equally) to further the wider public interest. In describing how the metaphoricalbalancemightbestruck,itbroughtintotheequationandattributed"dueweight" tothelimitsoftherightsthatthesystemprotects.Regardedinthisway,theboundariesand limitationsofthecopyrightinterestarenotexternaltocopyrightpolicy;theyareacentralpart ofhowthesystemworks. Withthisinmind,theoverarchingproblemassociatedwiththewidespreaduseofTPMsinthe dissemination of digital content is simple enough to state: TPMs do not-and generally cannot-distinguishbetweenlawfulandunlawfulusesandusers.Thereisnonecessary (and, typically,nopractical) correlationbetweenthelimitsimposedonwould-beusersbyTPMsand the rights granted to copyright owners under the law; the scope of protection afforded by technologyjustdoesnotmapontotheprotectionaffordedbylaw.Whilethelawattemptsto achieve balance between owners and users through careful circumscription of the copyright interestthatitcreates,technologyeffectivelysupplantsthelaw'ssolution,usurpingitspower to effectuate this delicate balance. The mismatch between technical control and the boundaries of the copyright interest is easily discerned both with regard to the kinds of activitiesthatownerscanpreventorcontrol,andtheextentoftheprotectedworkthatcanbe subjecttosuchcontrol.
1.ThePowertoControlAccess
First, simply by blocking access to content, TPMs provide protection beyond that granted to copyright owners by law. Activities such as reading, listening, and viewing have always been perfectly lawful-and of course desirable from a cultural policy perspective-in the analogue world. Nothing in the law of copyright would prohibit someone from flipping through a magazine in the doctor's office, borrowing a novel from a friend, listening to a roommate's musiccollection,orwatchingamovieonahomevideomachine.WiththeapplicationofTPMs tothedigitalembodimentsofsuchworks,however,theabilitytoread,listentoorviewthem canbemadesubjecttothepossessionofa"digitalkey." IntheThébergedecision,theSupremeCourtstatedthat"onceanauthorizedcopyofaworkis soldtoamemberofthepublic,itisgenerallyforthepurchaser,nottheauthor,todetermine whathappenstoit"(paragraph31).TPMsthoroughlydisruptthispremise (deBeerandGeist, 2008,p.173) .Intheanalogueworld,apersoncanre-readafavouritenoveluntilitisintatters, listenobsessivelytoafavouriterecord,devotedlywatchandre-watchafavouritemovie,and thensellorgiveawaythenovels,recordsandvideoswithwhichtheyfinallygrowbored.Inthe worldoftechnicalcontrols,reading,listeningorviewingcanbelimitedbythenumberofplays, the number (or even brand) of machines on which content can be played, the time during whichthecontentisavailableand/ortheidentityofthewould-belistenerorviewer.Thisnew reality, largely made possible by the operation of TPMs, has raised concerns about the social implicationsoferodingfreeuseintheshifttoa"pay-per-use"culture(seeSecor,1997).
13 Byaffordingownersthepowertocontrolpureaccesstoworks,TPMsgofurtherthancopyright protectioneverhas.Andtotheextentthataccesscontrolsarethemselvesprotectedbyanticircumventionlaws,theselawseffectivelyestablishalegalrighttocontrolaccess(an"access right" if you will [see Ginsburg, 1999, pp. 140-3, 147-8; Koelman, 1999] ) heretofore alien to copyrightlaw.Theimplicationsofsuchcontrolforcopyrightpolicyareincrediblysignificant.As JaneGinsburgexplains,"[e]veryactofperceptionorofmaterializationofadigitalcopyrequires aprioractofaccess. Andifthecopyrightownercancontrolaccess,shecanconditionhowa userapprehendsthework…."(2001,p.2) . Ginsburghasfamouslyarguedthat,withthearrivalofthedigitalage,theexploitationofworks hasshiftedfrompossessingcopiesto"experiencing"awork'scontent-andthisnewend-user realitycallsforanewbalancingofrightsinthedigitalera,whichmayentailanaccess-rightfor authors (1999, p. 5). 14 Certainly, Ginsburg is right to remind us that the very metaphor of balance signifies the need for constant monitoring and adjustment to maintain normative consistency in changing circumstances. I would suggest, however, that the creation of a new "rightagainstthegainingofunauthorizedaccess"doesnotregaincopyright'sequilibrium,but tipsthebalanceinfavourofowners,tothedetrimentofusersandthepublic,whoseaccessto cultural resources and freedom to engage in basic consumptive activities may be radically restrictedbysucharight. WhileTPMscreatethepowertocontrolaccess,anti-circumventionlawsestablisha"newrights structure," restricting public uses that have long been viewed as acceptable and desirable (Heide, 2001, p. 14 domain is now subject to the technological barriers that can prevent access to even IP-free informationresources.Anobviousconcernhereisthetechnicalprotectionofworksinwhich copyright protection has lapsed. While the copyright interest in a work exists for a limited (if long) period of time, TPMs can continue to erect a barrier around works after their legal entrance to the public domain, thereby undermining a crucial aspect of copyright policy: the limited duration of private rights has been a fundamental characteristic of copyright from its inception,andreflectsthe"deal"thatcopyrightstrikesbetweenthepublicandtheauthor.To grantlegalprotectionoverTPMsthatprotectpublicdomaincontentistosupplantcopyright's time-limited protection with a conceivably perpetual legal right to control access and restrict useofculturalresources. One response, consistent with WIPO treaty obligations, 15 may be to limit the protection of TPMstothosethatcontrolcopyright-protectedcontent,butthisoffersnosolutionwherethe contentbehindthedigitallockincludesbothprotectedandpublicdomainworks.Andwhileit maybearguedthatmanyormostpublicdomainworkswillalsobeavailablefromotherTPMfree sources, to require members of the public to find and use unencrypted versions may deprivethemofthebenefits(includingaccessibility,qualityandmanipulability)ofdigitizedor technologicallysuperiorversions.Notonlydoesthisargumentacceptanimpoverishedpublic domain, but it may also prove short-sighted as more and more of our culture is recorded, storedandarchivedindigitalform. ThepublicdomainobjectiontoTPMsisevenmoresignificantwhenwerecallthatthedividein copyrightlawbetweenpublicandprivatetraversestheprotectedwork;whilecopyrightvestsin the overall work, the ideas, information, systems, methods, mergers and unoriginal elements withinitcontinuetoresideinthepublicdomain (Samuelson,2003,p.151) .Asexplainedbythe Supreme Court of Canada, such limits on the author's right leave room for the production of "newworksbybuildingontheideasandinformationcontainedintheworksofothers" (CCH CanadianLtd.vLawSocietyofUpperCanada(CCH), paragraph23), 16 whichinturnallows"the public domain to flourish" (CCH, paragraph 23). Or, as Jessica Litman famously described it: "Thepublicdomainshouldbeunderstoodnotastherealmofmaterialsthatisundeservingof protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use" (Litman, 1990, p. 967) . The copyright balance thus demands that public domain elements of the protected work remain free for lawfulandunauthorizedpublicuse.TPMscanmakethesepublicdomainelementspractically unavailable,whileanti-circumventionlawscanmakeaccesstoanduseofthesepublicdomain elementsunlawful.WewoulddowelltoheedJusticeBinnie'swarninginthisregard:"Excessive controlbyholdersofcopyrightsandotherformsofintellectualpropertymayundulylimitthe abilityofthepublicdomaintoincorporateandembellishcreativeinnovationinthelong-term interests ofsocietyasawhole,orcreatepracticalobstaclestoproperutilization"(Théberge , paragraph32). Inordertooccupyitscentralroleinculturalpractices,thepublicdomainmustbeaccessibleto creativeactors;butratherthanprotectingtherightsofthepublictoaccessanduseresources in the public domain, anti-circumvention laws protect the right to lock-up these resources. Technological protection erects a fence around the entirety of a work without discriminating between protectable and unprotectable elements; to electrify these fences with the force of thelawisessentiallytoreinforceprivatelydrawnboundariesaroundpublicresources. 3.DisplacingFairDealing Finally, the clash between copyright policy and TPMs reveals itself in the predicament of fair dealing and other copyright exceptions.
17
The fair dealing defence permits fair dealings with copyrightprotectedworksforthepurposesofresearchorprivatestudy,criticismorreview,or news reporting (Copyright Act, sections 29-29.2).
18 Acts undertaken for these purposes that wouldprimafacieconstituteinfringement,arenonethelesslawfuliffoundtobefair,andif-in the case of criticism, review or news reporting-there is sufficient acknowledgement of the sourceandauthoroftheprotectedwork.
19
FurtherspecificexceptionsarefoundintheActfor e.g.,educationalinstitutions,libraries,archivesandmuseums(sections29.3-30.9). Inordertoappreciatethesignificanceoftheclashbetweendigitallocksandfairdealing,itis important to understand the role that fair dealing and other exceptions play in the copyright system. In CCH, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the concept of a copyright balance, 20 and its significanceinrelationtocopyrightexceptions:
[T]hefairdealingexception,likeotherexceptionsintheCopyrightAct,isauser's right.Inordertomaintaintheproperbalancebetweentherightsofacopyright ownerandusers'interests,itmustnotbeinterpretedrestrictively.AsProfessor Vaverhasexplained,'Userrightsarenotjustloopholes.Bothownerrightsand user rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remediallegislation'(CCH,paragraph48). Inthenameofbalance,theCourtgenerouslyinterpretedthefairdealingprovisionsinorder"to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained" (CCH, paragraph 51).
21
Against the backdrop of copyright's public purpose, fair dealing was recognized to be integral-not exceptional-to the system. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: "the fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of copyright" (CCH, paragraph 48 norms of Canadian copyright law, the fair dealing defence is an instantiation of the publicauthorbalance;onethatisnecessarytosupportthenormativeclaimssooftenmadeonbehalf on the system. As Drassinower (2005) explains: "the defence of fair dealing… is to be understoodanddeployednotnegatively,asamereexception,butratherpositively,asauser rightintegraltocopyrightlaw"(p.467). Itisalsoimportanttounderscore,atthisjuncture,thepotentialsignificanceoftheterm"users' rights" employed by the Supreme Court. Much has been made of this terminology and the equalityitbringstothebalancingofauthorialandpublicclaims (seeCraig,2005,pp.454-5) .For thepurposesofmyargument,however,itsimportanceliesprimarilyinthepositivenatureofa "userright,"incontrasttothenegativenatureofmeredefences,justifications,exemptionsor evenprivileges.AbasicHohfeldiananalysis (Hohfeld,1946) revealsthat,whenconceptualized asaprivilege,fairdealingestablishesonlythelibertyorfreedomtoact:theownerhasnoright to prevent theprivilegedactivity,andtheuserowesnodutytorefrainfromtheactivity. But conceptualizedasaright,fairdealingestablishesacorrespondingdutyonbehalfoftheowner to honour the user's right: in this analysis, the user has a positive claim-right against the copyrightownertobepermittedtodealfairlywiththework.Wherefairdealingisrecognized asa"userright,"itcanbearguedthatcopyrightownershaveacorrelativeobligationtopermit users'fairdealingswiththeirworks,TPMsnotwithstanding. Itisalsosignificantthatthescopeofauser'srightcannotbeclearlydelineatedoruniversally applied.Thelegalanalysisnecessarytodeterminewhetheraparticularusecanbeconsidered fairdealinginaparticularinstanceisacomplexonethatinvolvesacontextualexaminationof theuseanduser,andthebalancingofmultiplefactorsfromtheeconomicimpactoftheuseto thealternativesavailabletotheuser. 22 TPMsarenotcapableofperformingsuchananalysis, and as such, are not capable of permitting individual access for fair dealing purposes or permittingfairdealingsperse(evenintheunlikelyeventthatsucharesultweresought). The effect of a TPM is thus to prevent the kinds of activities that are recognized, within the realmofcopyrightpolicy,tobedeservingofprotectionfromprivateownerinterests,andtobe central to the balance that copyright must strike. Simply put, TPMs deny users the ability to exercisetheirrightsandtherebytipthebalanceawayfromusersandthepublicinterest.Here, again,itmaybearguedthataTPM-freeversionofaprotectedworkwilltypicallybeavailable for anyone who wishes to deal fairly with it. And so it is worth re-emphasizing that, from a policy perspective, it is not satisfactory to restrict fair dealings to technologically inferior versionsofcopyrightworks (Bechtold,2004,p.363 
IV.INPURSUITOFPRESCRIPTIVEPARALLELISM
A.PRESERVINGTHECOPYRIGHTBALANCE Theprincipleof"prescriptiveparallelism"wasarticulatedina2007articlebyUScommentators JeromeReichman,GraemeDinwoodieandPamelaSamuelson,to"conveythenotionthatthe traditional copyright balance of rights and exceptions should be preserved in the digital environment" (Reichman et al., , p. 1042 . The principle captures the general normative positionthat"atechnologicaladaptation,namely,theapplicationofTPMs,shouldnotalterthe balance that existed under default rules of copyright law with respect to the enjoyment of exceptions and limitations" (Reichman et al., , pp. 1041 . The intuitive appeal of this positionisquiteevident,andnicelycapturedinthefollowingwordsofHenningWiese (2002):
[W]hilst on the one hand copyright holders will have a justified interest in regaining control over the publication/dissemination of their works, users will haveanequalinterestinretaininginthedigitalenvironmentroughlythesame fair use defences. In essence, society as a whole-including copyright owners and copyright work users-will wish to retain roughly the same copyright balanceinvirtualrealitythathasservedallpartiesinvolvedsowellinthepast, the'realreality'(p.147). The problem, of course, is that the principle of prescriptive parallelism presents us with a challengethat,whileconceptuallyclear,willbeexceptionallyhardtomeetonapracticallevel. AsKerrandhisco-authorsrightlywarn,"[t]heensuingpolicyissueisnotmerelyaquestionof copyright'sabilitytobalancebutalsooneoftechnology'spowertocontrol" (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 .Thisisthechallengethatnowpresentsitselftopolicy-makersandtheCanadian copyrightsystem:howcancopyright'scomplicatedbalancingactcontinuetobeperformedin any meaningful way when the technological environment is increasingly one of absolutesabsolutefreedomversusabsolutecontrol?Morefundamentally,howcanthelawmaintainits role as the guardian of this metaphorical balance when its prescriptions are increasingly extraneoustotheactionsandactorsthatitpurportstoinfluence? Admittedly,acommitmenttotheprincipleofprescriptiveparallelismpresentsatleastasmany questions as answers. Nonetheless, in the context of digital copyright reform, the principle couldproveexceptionallyuseful:itoffersajumping-offpoint(anormativeclaim);itprovidesa senseofdirection(aguidepostbywhichtochartprogress);anditestablishesanideal(agoal againstwhichtomeasurepurportedsuccess).Itisalsodifficulttorefute,unlessoneiswillingto openly take issue with the foundational principles that underlie our existing institutional structures. In this sense, the principle wields some political clout. It may be that genuine prescriptiveparallelismisanunattainableaspiration,buttoadmitasmuchisnottoundermine its normative significance; it is a goal at which we should aim, and one that we should be determinedtoachievetothegreatestextentpossible. 1.RetainingtheBalancethroughInaction? Oneroutetowardsmaintainingcopyright'straditionalbalancemaybetosimplyleavethelaw asitis,fornowatleast;wecancontinuetoapplyandenforcetraditionalcopyrightnormswhile technologyandthemarketplaceevolveontheirownterms.Inthisway,thelawwillperformits traditional balancing act within its shrinking domain of influence. There are many commentatorsandstakeholderswhoadheretothisvision,andIamtemptedtocountmyself amongthem.Whenitcomestothelaw,afterall,thereareworsethingsthanirrelevance.As JessicaLitmanhasargued,thereissimplynoreasonforustoassumethatcopyrightlawsshould determinethemostbasic"rulesofthegame"incyberspace (Litman,2001,p.28) .Indeed,their complexity,inaccessibilityandlimitedfocusmakethemquiteinappositetothetask:
Copyrightlawhasanarrowfocus.Ithasneverpaidattentiontoawhole host of important interests that have traditionally informed our information policy,andcopyrightanalysisturnsouttohaveverylittleroominittodoso.
Inadditiontofreespeechconcerns,informationpolicytakesaccountof issuesrelatedtoequity,competition,ensuringadiversityofviewpoints,securing ready and affordable access to important sources of information privacy-all issuesthatareatbesttangentialtocopyrightlawandinsomecaseswhollyalien (Litman,2001,p.30) . As Litman argues, the significance of these limitations is far greater in a context where copyright law is expected to govern, not just the activities of commercial and institutional entitiesasithastraditionallydone,buttheeverydaybehaviourandinteractionsofmembersof thegeneralpublic. Litmanfurthercautionsthatthestructureandinvolvementofthecopyrightcommunityinthe copyrightreformprocessmakeit"difficult topreventfoolishapproachestonewtechnology" (Litman,2001,p.22) .Reformsinresponsetotechnologicaladvancesaretypicallyfoughtoutby industry stakeholders determined to regain old benefits enjoyed before the technological advance,whileretaininganynewbenefitsthatthetechnologymayafford (Litman,2001,p.22) . Notably,amongstsuch"foolish"approaches,LitmanappearstoincludetheenactmentofanticircumventionlawsintheUSDigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct(DMCA). 23 Inasimilarvein,LauraMurrayhasobserved"thenear-perfectmatchbetweentherhetoricof wonder and panic at digital technologies and the hyperbole and hysteria that greeted the telegraph, the telephone, the television, and the photocopier" (Murray, 2005, p. 26 responses risk becoming dated and "loophole-ridden" legal regimes, failing to reflect our evolvingunderstandingofthenewtechnologyandtherolethatitwillcometooccupyinour market place and society (Murray, 2005, p. 26 ). Kerr and his co-authors issue a similar exhortation,urging:
[U]ntil the market for digital content and the norms surrounding the use and circumvention of TPMs (and their implications for that market) become better known,itissimplyprematuretotrytoascertainwhattheappropriatepractical legal response should be….
[M]aking policy decisions without such knowledge couldresultingreatharmtothepublicinterest (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 . 24 This position is consistent with the general principle of technological neutrality, which stands against the implementation of technology-specific norms that are unlikely to maintain their relevance and applicability as technologies inevitably evolve (Kerr et al., 2002 (Kerr et al., -2003 . 25 Indeed,somearguethattheevolutionoftechnologyhasalreadyrenderedtheTPM-protection debate out-dated. As consumers become increasingly cognizant of, and resistant to, the limitationsimposedbydigitallocksandotherrightsmanagementtechnologies,theargument goes, market forces should gradually increase demand for free as opposed to controlled content,withcontentprovidersnecessarilyreactingtosuchmarketdictates.Apple'sdecision tosellDigitalRightsManagement(DRM)-freemusicthroughtheiTunesstoreiscommonlycited insupportofthisthesis.
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Theproblemisthatitassumesawell-functioningcompetitivemarket for DRM-protected and DRM-free content, and minimizes the impact of network and lock-in effects,informationasymmetriesandothercausesofmarketfailure (Bechtold,2004,p.362) . Whateverdegreeoffaithwearewillingtoplaceinsuchmarketforcesovertime,wecanlikely agreethatTPMsandDRMtechnologieslooksettostaywithusforawhile. Whileinactionmaypreservetheinternalcoherenceand"balance"ofthecopyrightsystem,its capacitytoachieveanactualbalanceinouroverallinformationsystemisunderminedwhenits prescriptions become divorced from common practice. Inaction could thus result in the marginalizationofcopyrightanditsnormativesignificanceastechnologyandtechnologicalselfhelpestablishthenormsofbehaviouronline. 2.RegainingtheBalancethroughLegislativeReform Ifweassumethatcopyrightshouldplayasignificantroleinregulatingculturalpracticesinthe digitalenvironment-andweacceptthatthisisgoodpolicyasopposedtoanactofhubrison the part of copyright lawyers (compare to Litman, 2001 , p. 30)-then it seems reasonable to assertthatsomedegreeoflegalreformisnecessarytorespondtotechnologicalchangesthat have rendered certain traditional copyright assumptions outmoded. This logic suggests an alternative route towards maintaining copyright's balance while also striving to preserve its relevance: namely, amending existing laws to better regulate the use of technology and the digitalmarketplaceinawaythatcanachieveprescriptiveparallelisminpractice.
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue
When anti-circumvention laws are rationalized as "enhanced legal protection for copyright owners in light of enhanced copying capacity" (Reichman et al., , p. 1042 , the implicit assumptionisthatafurtherlayerofprotectionisnecessarytoreinstatecopyright'sbalancein the face of new technologies.
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In pursuit of this balance, however, adjustments may also be needed to the legal rights of copyright users in light of the availability, application and legal protectionofTPMs (Wiese,2002,p.147) .Ifweacceptthat,asamatterofsubstantiveprinciple, "theapplicationofTPMsshouldnotalterthebalanceofrightsbetweencopyrightownersand users," then it ought to follow that "all uses privileged under traditional copyright principles shouldcontinuetobeprivilegedinaneraofdigitalrightsmanagement" (Reichmanetal.,2007 (Reichmanetal., , p. 1045 ). This assertion is consistent with (and arguably mandated by) the recognition of exceptions to authors' rights as integral to the copyright system. As such, any new digital copyrightregimethatisrationalizedintermsofreinstatingcopyright'sbalanceinthedigitalera must offer a comprehensive regulatory approach-one that establishes a "symmetric" environment in which the legitimate interests of both rightholders and users are protected (Bechtold,2004,p.363 ). Reichman and his co-authors argue that, if the principle of prescriptive parallelism is to be respectedinthefaceofTPMprotections,"usersneedamechanismbywhichtovindicatetheir rights and to secure the certainty required to engage in creative activity privileged under traditional copyright principles" (Reichman et al., , p. 1045 . In pursuit of prescriptive parallelism in Canada, it is suggested that any new anti-circumvention provisions must also establishamechanismbywhichuserscanvindicatetheirrights,exercisetheirprivileges,and feel safe in the knowledge that they will not incur liability for doing so. Admittedly, such a mechanism could prove complex and costly to implement, but we must be willing to assume thesecostsandtacklethesecomplexitiesifwegodownthepathofprohibitingcircumvention whilemaintainingagenuinecommitmenttocopyright'sbalance.(Andifsuchmechanismsare toocomplexorcostly,wemayhavetoreconsiderthewisdomoftakingthatpath).
B.LEGISLATIVEMEASURESANDMECHANISMSTOVINDICATEUSERRIGHTS
With a view to identifying the possibilities, promises and potential pitfalls of a new Canadian TPM protection regime, this section will canvas some approaches taken in other jurisdictions towardsthereconciliationofTPMprotectionandcopyrightlimitations,andtheextenttowhich theseapproacheshavebeenabletomeettheprincipleddemandsofprescriptiveparallelism. Thiswillprovidethecomparativeperspectivenecessaryforustoproceed,inthenextsection, towardsrecommendationsforCanadianreform. access to a protected work (regardless of whether such access results in copyright infringement)( §1201(a)(1)(A)),andforbidsthemanufacture,distribution,andimportationof circumventiontools(includingtoolsthatcircumventboth"access-contol"measuresanduse-or "rights-control"measures)( §1201(a)(2)and( §1201(b)).
29 Becauseprotectiondoesnotattach touse-controlmeasures,ithasbeensuggestedthatfairuseisnotperseaffectedbytheanticircumvention measures. Indeed, §1201(c)(1) explicitly states that, "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,inthistitle."Ofcourse,therealityisthataccesstoaworkisaprerequisiteoffairuse,and accesstoacircumventiontoolmaybeaprerequisiteofaccesstoaTPM-protectedwork.The effectoftheaccess-controlcircumventionprohibitionandcircumventiondeviceprohibitionsis the practical restriction of otherwise lawful fair use activities in relation to TPM-protected content. The DMCA anti-circumvention rules are subject to a set of seven narrow and hard-fought exceptions 30 that shield circumvention activities from liability in specific circumstances, including, for example: non-profit libraries making acquisition decisions ( §1201 (d)); governmental actors conducting national security activities ( §1201 (e)); and encryption researchers identifying vulnerabilities in encryption technologies ( §1201 (g)). 31 Litman has rightly accused these exceptions of being "cast in prose so crabbed and so encumbered with conditions as to be of little use to anyone who doesn't have a copyright lawyer around to explainwhichhoopstojumpthrough" (Litman,2001,p.31) . In addition to the specified exemptions, the DMCA authorizes the Librarian of Congress, in consultationwiththeRegisterofCopyright,toassesstheimpactofthecircumventionbanon traditionalfairusepracticesand,ifnecessary,toissuerulesexemptingcertainusersofcertain categories of works from the ban ( §1201 (a)(1)(B)-(D)). The 2006 round of this triennial rulemakingproceedingyieldedtemporaryexemptionsforsixnarrowlydefinedclassesofworks. 32 However, such exemptions are not permitted to extend to the prohibition on circumvention technologies (device controls), with the consequence that, "[a]s a practical matter,…any exemptionsultimatelydeclaredwillhaveverylimitedutility;self-evidently,mostuserswillbe unabletoexercisetheircircumventionrightsunlesstheyareprovidedwiththetoolstodoso" (Burk and Cohen, 2001, pp. 49-50) . Moreover, by granting such power to an administrative agency,thisprocedurehastheclearandapparentlyintendedeffectofreducingtheroleofthe courtsandtherelevanceoffairuseinthedigitalage (seeHermanandGandyJr.,2006) . 33 The prospective creation of exemptions based on "classes of works" turns on its head the traditionally purposive, use-based and post hoc application of fair use by the courts (Herman andGandyJr.,2006,pp.143-4) .TheclearimpoverishmentoffairuseeffectuatedbytheDMCA ledDavidNimmertosuggestthattheActwas"aconsciouscontractionofuserrights" (Nimmer, 2000,p.675; citedinHermanandGandyJr.,2006,p.187 [CSS] on commericial DVDs, allowing users to copy and manipulate a DVD's content. In an amicus brief, Professors Benkler and Lessig described CSS as "a device that makes fair and otherwise privileged uses of digitized materials practically impossible" (Benkler and Lessig, 2001) . The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the DMCA, arguing inter alia that it undulyobstructsthe"fairuse"ofcopyrightmaterials.TheUSDistrictCourtheldthatfairuse was not a defence to violations of the DMCA and issued injunctions. Upholding this decision, theUSCourtofAppealsdismissedtheappellant'sconstitutionalclaimas"extravagant."
36 The appellantwasnotpersonallyengagedinanyfairuseofcopyrightmaterials,andthecourtwas unimpressedbytheargumentthatthedeviceswerenecessaryforotherstomakefairusesof CSS protected content. Indeed, the Court was not persuaded that CSS prevents fair uses, not least because "[f]air use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original." 37 Notably,theCSShasprovedtobe"thesinglemostcontroversialTPMschemeconsideredinthe triennial rulemaking proceedings" under the regulatory powers granted to the Librarian of Congress (Hermann & Gandy, 2006, p. 187-8.) . Despite hundreds of calls for exemptions and manydocumentedharmstofairuse,"itremainsillegaltocircumventtheaccesscontrolsona legally purchased DVD, even for purposes such as playing it on one's home machine or using fifteensecondsoffootageforscholarlycommentary" (HermanandGandyJr.,2006,p.188 ).An exemptionaddedafterthe2006rulemakingproceedingwaslimitedto:
audiovisualworksincludedintheeducationallibraryofacollegeoruniversity'sfilmor media studies department, when circumvention is accomplished for the purpose of makingcompilationsofportionsofthoseworksforeducationaluseintheclassroomby mediastudiesorfilmprofessors. 38 Such a limited exemption serves only to underscore the inadequacies of the rulemaking procedure, and to reveal the virtually insurmountable burden imposed of those who seek exemptionsfromthecircumventionprohibitionsundertheDMCA. 2.LookingtoEurope:TheEUCopyrightDirective TheEuropeanUnionfollowedtheUnitedStates'leadwhenitissueditsCopyrightDirectiveof 2001,requiringmemberstatestoenactbroadanti-circumventionprohibitionsagainstallacts of circumvention and the trafficking of circumvention devices and services, and thereby far exceedingthescopeofTPMprotectiondemandedbytheWIPOtreaties. 39 TheDirectivedoes not contain built-in exceptions such as those in the DMCA, but instead addresses the interactionbetweenTPMprotectionanduserexceptionsinArticle6(4),whichstates:"inthe absence of voluntary measures taken by right holders…Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that right holders make available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in national law…the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation." Article6(4)issignificant-perhapseven"ratherrevolutionary" (Dusollier,2003 ,p.52)-tothe extentthatitattributesapositivedimensiontocopyrightexceptions,recognizingtheneedto facilitate(asopposedtomerelypermit)theexerciseofexceptionstoowners'rights.Reichman and his co-authors identify, within this provision, an important "normative commitment to ensuring that certain public interest uses can be made of technically protected works" (Reichmanetal.,2007,p.984) .Asanapparentattempttomaintainthebalanceofcopyrightin the face of TPM protection, Article 6(4) seems premised to some degree on the principle of prescriptiveparallelism (Reichmanetal.,2007 (Reichmanetal., ,p.1042 . 40 However,astheseauthorsandmany others have noted, its actual prescriptions fall well short of realizing this ostensible principle (seeHugenholtz,2000; Dusollier,2003; Riechmanetal.,2007 Riechmanetal., ,pp.1041 . Theprovisionemploysa"fairusebymandate"approach 41 byleavingittocopyrightowners,in the first instance, to find a solution to the tension between TPMs and copyright exceptions. Onlyintheabsenceof"voluntarymeasures"(thenatureandscopeofwhichisleftundefined) doestheState'sobligationarise.
42
Thisapproachactuallyreinforcestheprimacyoftheprivate orderingmodelsupportedbyTPMs,whichisfurtherevidencedbythedecisiontoexcludefrom theapplicationofArticle6(4)"worksmadeavailabletothepubliconagreedcontractualterms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them."
43 This effectively exempts on-demand services from the obligationtosafeguarduserexceptions;rightholderswhomaketheirworksavailableonlineon agreedcontractualterms(obviouslyanimportantandgrowingdigitaldistributionmodel)can presumably continue to prevent users from benefiting from copyright exceptions (Akester, 2009,p.17) . 44 TheimpactofArticle6(4)isfurtherlessenedbyitsrestrictiontobeneficiarieswith"legalaccess to the protected work." Only users with prior lawful access to the work are empowered to exercise exceptions, but there is apparently no obligation for owners to grant access to such users. Consequently, the safeguard provision does not appear to shield lawful uses from the effectsofaccess-controlTPMs. Finally, but crucially, Article 6(4) applies only to seven specified (and seemingly arbitrary) exceptions out of the twenty-three permitted exceptions listed in Article 5 of the Directive. 45 Notably excluded from the application of Article 6(4) are exceptions for parody and news reporting-both activities that we may typically associate with fair use rights, and both exceptions that are widely understood to reflect a concern with fundamental freedoms of speechandthepress (Dusollier,2003,p.53) .Indeed,evenwithregardtothesevenexceptions that are listed, Article 6(4) operates only to safeguard the benefit of exceptions that are "provided for in national law." Member states are permitted, but not required, to enact the enumeratedexceptions,withtheresultthatArticle6(4)"make[s]mandatorythesafeguarding ofexceptionsbutnottheirenactment" (Dusollier,2003,p.53) . 46 While, conceptually speaking, Article 6(4) of the EU Copyright Directive was both novel and laudable,itspotentialtoachieveprescriptiveparallelismhasbeensignificantlyunderminedby these various textual and practical limitations. To the extent that it purports to protect the public values embraced by copyright limitations, it is a "toothless tiger" (Bechtold, 2004, p. 379) . Beneath the ostensible promise of balance, the EU copyright regime supports private orderingbyrightholdersthroughtheuseofTPMsthatrestrictotherwiselawfulusesofdigital content. 47 Predictably, then, national implementations of the EU Copyright Directive have produced a wide variety of different approaches to the problem of TPM protection and copyright exceptions, which have largely failed to adequately safeguard public uses of TPMprotectedcontentortoachieveaparallelbalanceofinterestsinthedigitalrealm (Reichmanet al.,2007,p.984) . TheDirectivepermitsmemberstatestopursuea"wait-and-see"strategy,takingnoimmediate stepstoensurethatthebeneficiariesofexceptionscanactuallyenjoythem (Gasser,2006,p. 77) .Austria,forexample,hasenactednoexceptionstoitsbroadanti-circumventionprovisions, opting instead to assume that voluntary and market-driven measures will adequately enable theexerciseofexistingexceptions,andempoweringtheMinisterofJusticeandagovernment departmenttoreporttoParliamentrecommendinglegislativemeasuresifsuchprovesnotto be the case. The Czech Republic and the Netherlands have similarly left it to the executive powertotakeappropriatemeasurestosafeguarduserexceptionsonlyifandwhennecessary (CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunity,2007; seealsoGasser,2006,p.77 parallelism to any significant degree. Even in those member states that did opt to enact legislative safeguards for user exceptions, the execution of the exception regime is typically cumbersome and impractical for the would-be beneficiaries (Wang, 2006, p. 243; citing Midgley,2002) .Wherebeneficiariesareempoweredtoseekinjunctiverelieffromthecourts, oreventoinitiatemediation,theyareinvitedtoembarkuponapotentiallycostly,prolonged, and onerous course of action that is unlikely to make sense for the average user. Mediation solutions reduce the exercise of permitted acts to a matter for negotiation or rightholder authorizationnotdissimilartothatrequiredinrespectofrestrictedacts (Dusollier,2003,p.73) . Administrativesolutionsmaybeevenmoreburdensome:intheUnitedKingdom,forexample, rightholders have no pre-existing obligation to facilitate the exercise of permitted acts; the SecretaryofStatehasnoobligationtoordertherightholdertodoso;thecomplainanthasno righttoappealtheSecretary'sdecision;andfailuretocomplywithanordermerelyestablishes a right of action, making the pre-requisite complaint process little more than an additional administrative hurdle for the would-be beneficiary. While the enforcement powers of the French ARMPTP, together with the right to appeal its decisions, make it perhaps the most interestinginitiative,theadministrativeburdenimposedonusersmaynonethelessrepresenta significantbarriertotheexerciseofpermittedacts.Intheabsenceofefficient,effective,and readily accessible enforcement structures throughout the EU member states, the apparent promiseofArticle6(4)isfarfrombeingfulfilled. 3.BeyondEurope:NewZealand'sExample Beyond Europe, New Zealand offers an interesting example of a novel solution to the problematic interaction of TPM-protection and copyright exceptions. The Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008 prohibits the distribution of circumvention devices, services and information where it is known that such will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright(section226A).Notably,theprohibitionsdonotextendtoactsofcircumventionper se,andnordotheyprotectpureaccess-controlTPMs.Inadditiontothecarefulcircumscription of anti-circumvention rights, the Act includes positive measures to protect beneficiaries of copyright exceptions. First, it explicitly states that the rights granted to the issuer of a TPM work "do not prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act" (section 226D(1)) and that "[n]othinginthisActpreventsanypersonfromusingaTPMcircumventiondevicetoexercisea permittedact"(section226E(1)).Secondly,itintroducesnewprovisionsenablingapersonwho wishes to carry out a permitted act to seek assistance from the copyright owner and/or a qualifiedpersoninordertocircumventaTPM(section226E(2)). 51 A"qualifiedperson"meansa librarianofaprescribedlibrary,anarchivistofanarchive,aneducationalestablishment,orany personspecifiedbytheGovernor-GeneralbyOrderinCouncilunderanewregulation-making power(section226D(3)).Byempoweringcertainpeopletooffercircumventionservices,andby enablingthesepeopletobelawfullysuppliedwithcircumventiondevices,theapproachtaken by New Zealand goes some way towards ensuring that non-infringing activities in respect of TPM-protected works are not merely permitted, but also practicable. 52 How the system will workinpracticeremainstobeseen. V.ANTI-CIRCUMVENTIONANDTHEFATEOFFAIRDEALINGINCANADA:PROBLEMSAND PROPOSALS Ascountriesaroundtheworlddevelopandimplementnewlegislativeandregulatoryschemes for protecting TPMs, the practical and political implications of TPM protection, and the challenges of integrating user and public interest exceptions into these protective schemes, become increasingly clear. The good news, however, is that Canada is now in an excellent positiontobenefitfromthelessonsthathavebeenlearnedelsewhere,andtochooseitspath intothedigitalfuturewiththebenefitofothernations'hindsight.Inthissection,Iwillprovidea brief overview of the two "false starts" that Canada has made in the race to introduce anticircumvention protection. I will go on to suggest possible solutions to the current impassewhichwillalsoserveasacritiqueofCanada'spreviousattemptstointroduceTPMprotectionand canvas some available means by which we may yet achieve prescriptive parallelism, to a greaterorlesserdegree.
A.TWOFALSESTARTS Inalawreformprocessthatbeganbackin2001,CanadianHeritageandIndustryCanadaare currently formulating what will be the third iteration of proposed anti-circumvention legislation, which will follow on the heels of two previous Bills-and two starkly different approaches to the protection of TPMs. Bill C-60, which represented the first attempt to introduceanti-circumventionprovisions,wasdevelopedunderandsweptasidewithCanada's Liberal government. Section 34.02(1) of Bill C-60 sought to establish legal protection for TPMs 53 : 34.02(1)Anownerofcopyrightinawork,aperformer'sperformancefixedina sound recording or a sound recording…are, subject to this Act, entitled to all remedies…that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right against a person who, without the consent of the copyright owner…, circumvents,removesorinanywayrendersineffectiveatechnologicalmeasure protecting any material form of the work, the performer's performance or the sound recording for the purpose of an act that is an infringement of the copyrightinitorthemoralrightsinrespectofitorforthepurposeofmakinga copyreferredtoinsubsection80(1). [Emphasisadded] . TheeffectofthisprovisionwouldhavebeentomakeitaninfringementtocircumventaTPM, butonlyifthisweredoneforthepurposeofanactconstitutinginfringementofthecopyrightin theunderlyingwork. 54 Thissuggeststhatcircumventionforthepurposesoffairdealingwould have remained lawful (Geist, 2005, p. 242 55 thelegislativeintentwasclearly to tie liability for the provision of circumvention services to actual acts of copyright infringement. Moreover, the bill established no legal limitation on circumvention devices or technologies (Geist,2005,p.242) . BillC-60wasthuscompliantwiththeWCT,butinawaythatrecognized-andgenerallytook advantage of-the limits and flexibility of Article 11 to minimize the potential impact of anticircumventionlawsbeyondthatofexistingcopyrightnorms.Bylinkingcircumventionliability to copyright infringement liability, it proposed an additional level protection for rightholders without substantially widening the net of liability to catch activities that would have been lawful in the absence of these additional protections. In doing so, the bill was apparently intended to maintain the balance between owners and users struck by traditional copyright norms,andtoavoidincreasingthescopeofrightsconnectedtocopyrightownership. Bill C-60 was nonetheless vulnerable to the criticism that traditional copyright limits and exceptionswerenotexplicitlyprotectedorpositivelysafe-guardedagainsttheoperationofthe anti-circumvention provisions, never mind the operation of TPMs themselves. To the existing fearsofcopyrightinfringementsuitsandthecurtailmentseffectedbytheproliferationofTPMs, Bill C-60 would have added the risk of liability for TPM circumvention-a further threat with whichtochillusesofprotectedcontent.BillC-60didnotoffertoprotectusersandthepublic from the effects of TPMs and anti-circumvention liability (Geist, 2005, pp. 248-9) . 56 In this sense, the bill offered nothing to proactively maintain the copyright balance against the disruptiveimpactofthewidespreaduseofTPMs. While the fate of C-60 was sealed with the fall of the Liberal government, the drive towards newlegislationcontinuedunderthenewConservativegovernment.WhereasBillC-60treada moderatepathwithregardtonewanti-circumventionprovisions,BillC-61,tabledin2008,was designedtooffer"strongerlegalprotectionforT[P]Msordigitallocksappliedbyrightsowners todigitalworks" (GovernmentofCanada,2008a) .Whilethisbillwasalsodestinedtodieonthe order paper when a federal election was called in September 2008, it may be a harbinger of what we can expect in any future copyright reform bill brought under the re-instated Conservative minority government, which continues to proclaim its commitment to new legislation "to modernize Canada's copyright laws and ensure stronger protection for intellectualproperty"(GovernmentofCanada,2008c). IncontrasttotherelativelysuccinctTPMprovisionsofBillC-60(whichamountedtoonesection with three sub-sections), C-61 contained thirteen complex sections with innumerable subsectionsprescribingthebroadprotectionofTPMsandthenarrowlimitsthereto.Notably, BillC-61offeredpureaccess-controlTPMsthesameprotectionasTPMsthatrestrictprotected usesofunderlyingworks. 57 Thebillcrossedanotherimportantlinebyprohibiting,inadditionto circumventionactivitiesandservices,devicesortechnologiesthatpermitthecircumventionof TPMs. 58 Whether a particular technology would caught by this prohibition was to be 61 BillC-61setoutspecificexceptionstocircumventionliability-aswellasnumerousexceptions to these exceptions-relating to law enforcement or national security (section 41.11), computer program interoperability (section 41.12), encryption research (section 41.13), the collection/communication of personal information (section 41.14), the security of computer systems/networks (section 41.15), persons with perceptual disabilities (section 41.16), and ephemeralrecordingsbybroadcastundertakings(section41.17).Thus,forexample,aperson circumventing a TPM for the purpose of encryption research would escape liability only if: it wouldnothavebeenpracticaltocarryouttheresearchwithoutcircumventingtheTPM;s/he lawfullyobtainedtheprotectedwork;s/heinformedthecopyrightownerwhoappliedtheTPM (presumably,thats/hewouldbecircumventingtheTPMforresearchpurposes);ands/hedid nothinginrelationtotheunderlyingworkthatwouldconstituteaninfringementofcopyright (section41.13). The Bill sought to establish the power for the Governor in Council to make additional regulationstocreatefurtherspecificexceptionswheretechnologicalmeasures"wouldunduly restrict competition in the aftermarket sector in which the technological measure is used" (section41.2(1)).Itenvisagedthepossibilityoffurtherregulationsrestrictingliabilityforactsof circumvention(but,notably,notforliabilityrelatingtocircumventionservicesortechnologies) to be made in consideration of an open list of factors, including: whether the prohibition against acts of circumvention could adversely affect authorized uses; whether it would adversely affect criticism, review, news reporting, commentary, teaching, scholarship or researchthatcouldbemadeordoneinrespectofthework;whetheritcouldadverselyaffect themarketfortheunderlyingwork;andthework'scommercialavailability(section41.2(2)(a)). An interesting provision contemplated the possibility of a positive claim against copyright owners,empoweringtheGovernorinCounciltomakeregulationsrequiringownerstoprovide access to a protected work to persons entitled to benefit from any limitations established in lightofthesefactors(section41.2(2)(b)). 62 Overall,BillC-61failedtoreflectthelessonsreadilydrawnfromtheexperiencesoftheUnited StatesandEurope:itsoughttoestablishbroadanti-circumventionrightscoveringdevicesand services,access-anduse-controlmeasures,andtodosowithouttyingtheserightstocopyright infringement; it set out numerous complex exceptions with no general "fair circumvention" exception; it neglected even to offer lip-service to the preservation of fair dealing rights comparabletostatementsfoundinArticle6(4)oftheE.U.Directiveorsection1201(a)ofthe DMCA;itoffloadedtheresponsibilityforcarvingoutanymoreexceptionsontheGovernorin Council, without making clear on what basis such exceptions would be regulated, on whose request,andsubjecttowhatevidentiaryburden; 63 anditestablishednopositiveobligationsfor content providers, leaving any such obligations to be created through regulation, and only in respect of any new exceptions made under this regulatory power. It is also significant that "new" exceptions that were included in the bill-exceptions for format and time shifting, for example-were made subject to non-circumvention provisos that would render them redundantinthefaceofTPMs, 64 therebyprivilegingTPMsoverthepublicpolicygoalsthatthe exceptionswereostensiblydesignedtoserve. Bills C-60 and C-61 thus took practically polemic approaches to the enactment of anticircumvention provisions. While the former bill would have established a new level of protectionforcopyrightownersandtherebymorethansatisfiedtherequirementsoftheWIPO Treaties,itwouldhavedonesoatrelativelyminimalistlevel,essentiallyduplicatingtheexisting scope (if not the basis) of liability under existing copyright norms. In contrast, Bill C-61 went significantly beyond the protections required by the treaties. While C-61 included limitations notarticulatedinC-60,thesedidnotamounttoabroadorprincipledrestrictionofthescopeof anti-circumvention rights; rather, the complexity and rigidity of these narrowly constructed exceptions suggested only a grudging willingness to make minimal carve-outs to far-reaching prohibitions.Inthisway,BillC-61failedtoreflectthecentralityoffairdealingandthepublic domainincopyrightpolicy,treatingtheminsteadasmarginalelementsoftheexistingsystem that could be reduced or eliminated to better protect owner interests in the digital environment.Indoingso,itthreatenedtosignificantlyupsetthecopyrightbalanceestablished inCanadaandarticulatedbyourSupremeCourt. In choosing its approach to the legal regulation of TPMs, Parliament is not constitutionally boundtofollowtheconclusionsoftheSupremeCourtortopursuethegoalsofthecopyright system as defined by the Court-but one might expect that Parliament would be duly influencedbythereasoningofthehighestcourtoftheland,andwouldshareitscommitment to achieving a balanced copyright system (Murray, 2005, p. 652) . As Geist explains, "[b]y sending a clear message about its support for a fair copyright balance [in Théberge], the Supreme Court has indirectly provided the most important submission on the current digital copyrightreformconsultations" (Geist,2002; citedinKerretal.,2002 citedinKerretal., -2003 .Since2002, the Court has reiterated, expanded on and applied its vision of balance-making further indirect contributions to a consultation process that continues today. And, indeed, the governmentclaimstohavebeenguided,inthecopyrightreformprocess,bytheprinciplethat "the rights of those who hold copyright must be balanced with the needs of users to access copyright works" (Government of Canada, 2008 (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 .Whileownersanddistributors wouldcontinuetouseTPMstoerectfencesaroundcontent,thesefenceswouldnotbeactively encouraged-or"electrified"-bythecreationoflegalprohibitions. Inthosejurisdictionsthathavealreadyenactedanti-circumventionlaws,theswiftandfrequent calls for further amendments to correct these new regimes add credibility to the claim that suchlawsmaystillbeprematureandrifewithunintendedconsequences.TheUnitedStateshas seenseveralattemptstoamendtheDMCAtobetterreflectthelimitsofcontrolconsistentwith traditional copyright policy and the Constitution. 65 Recent reports in Europe have identified serious concerns with the EU Copyright Directive and its implementation by member states (Akester, year; Gowers, 2007; Guibault et al., 2007) . As other legislatures come under increasing pressure to correct perceived mistakes in their digital copyright laws, Canadians shouldtakesomecomfortinthepossibilitythatinactionmayyetbeprovedtohavebeenthe best course of action. In Israel, which, like Canada, has signed but not ratified the WIPO Treaties, a "wait-and-see" approach has apparently found favour; recent amendments to the copyright legislation simply did not include the introduction of anticipated TPM protection measures (see deBeer, 2009, p. 6; Israel's Copyright Act 2007 ). An official statement by the GovernmentofIsraelexplainedthisinactionwithreferencetothewidespreadcriticismofTPMs and doubts as to their continued commercial relevance (Government of Israel, 2008; cited in deBeer,2009,p.7,note22) .TheGovernmentofIsraelwascorrecttoassertthat,absentan international obligation to enact legal protections for TPM, other nations have no legitimate basis for complaintagainstanationthatoptsto"waitandsee" (GovernmentofIsrael,2008, pp.8-9) . Eventhisapproach,however,leavesunansweredthequestionofhowtoactivelyaccommodate fair and lawful uses of protected works to ensure the appropriate balance between owners' rightsandthepublicinterest.TheprotectionofTPMsmaybeunnecessary,butitmaystillbe thatthepublicneedslegalprotectionfromTPMs (Kerretal.,2002 (Kerretal., -2003 .Inthissense, the absence of anti-circumvention laws is not a genuine "solution" to problem of reconciling TPMsanduserrights;abalancedcopyrightsystemmayrequireappropriatestepstobetaken toprotectpermittedacts.Butfromapoliticalperspective,thegovernmentislesslikelytoface pressuretocreateasystemtosafeguardlawfulusesofprotectedcontentifitsimplydeclines toenterthefray.Ratherthanbuttressingtheinterestsofeitherownersorusers,theuseand abuseoftechnologicalmeasureswouldbelefttorunitscoursesubjecttoexistinglegalnorms. Particularly in light of the costs and complexities of the alternatives canvassed below, this approachsurelyhasmuchtorecommendit. (2010) (MurrayandTrosow,2007,p.205; Kerret al.,2002 Kerret al., -2003 . Oneoptionthathasreceivedlittleconsiderationisthepossibilityofmakingthelegalprotection of TPMs subject to certain formalities. By establishing a new TPM registry at the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, for example, it would be possible to subject TPM protection to appropriaterequirements,whichcouldrelatetotheeffectivenessand/orrestrictivenessofthe TPMforwhichprotectionissought,and/orconditionprotectiononthedepositofaTPM-free digitalcopy,ora"digitalkey"ordecryptioncode(orevenaguaranteethatsuchwillbemade availabletofacilitatelawfulusesonrequest).CIPOortheregistrarwouldthenbewellplacedto actasanindependentintermediaryintheresolutionofaccessdisputes. 66 If Parliament prefers to proceed with automatic protection for TPMs, the original bill C-60 providesadecentexampleofwhataminimalistapproachmightlooklike.Inapplication,this approachwouldproduceTPMprotectionsthatcloselyalignwiththeexistingrightsofcopyright owners, essentially reinforcing copyright proper by limiting unlawful circumvention to acts undertakenforpurposesofcopyrightinfringement.Consistentwiththisminimalistapproach, protection would be afforded only to use-control TPMs. This could be achieved by defining technicalmeasuresintermsoftheirabilitytoinhibitorpreventinfringingacts,aswasdonein Bill C-60, and ideally with the explicit exclusion of measures that control access to works for non-infringingpurposes,asseenintheNewZealandlegislation. 67 Furthermore,aminimalistapproachtoTPMprotectionwouldnotincludedeviceprohibitions. Whileaprohibitiononthemanufacturinganddistributionofcircumventiontechnologieswould increase the ease and efficiency with which content providers could prevent circumventions, such technologies must be available to those who wish to access and use protected works in non-infringing ways. In CCH, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff copyright owners the easiestroutetowardspreventingawidespread,potentiallyinfringingactivitybecausetheresult would have been to shift the copyright balance too far in favour of owners' rights, and to interferewith"theproperuseofcopyrightedworksforthegoodofsocietyasawhole"(CCH, paragraph 41). The same considerations and commitment to balance ought to warn us away from the enactment of circumvention device prohibitions as a shortcut to restrict circumventionactivities.Whereadistributorofcircumventiontechnologiesoughttobeliable for subsequent infringement by third parties, that person will incur liability for "authorizing infringement"underexistingcopyrightnorms. 68 ShouldParliamentchoosetotakethealternativerouteofrestrictingcircumventiondevices,a reasonablybalancedsystemwouldrequirearestrictivedefinitionoftechnologiescaughtbythe prohibition, which would not unduly impede the development and availability of dual-use 69 Finally,anyanti-circumventionprovisionsinCanadashouldoperate"withoutprejudice"tothe exceptions contained in the Copyright Act. Tying circumvention liability to copyright infringement goes part way to achieving this goal by implicitly permitting the lawful circumventionofTPMsforthepurposesoffairdealingandotherpermittedacts.However,it would be preferable to see, in any new circumvention provisions, an explicit statement that circumventionisnotprohibitedwhenundertakenforlawfulpurposesincludingfairdealings. Inordertoensurethatfairdealingsandotherpermittedactsarenotonlylawfulonthebooks but also possible in practice, a revised Copyright Act should establish positive obligations for rightholders to facilitate fair and lawful dealings with TPM-protected works. 70 This could take the form of a basic requirement-similar to that found in the German law 71 -that owners facilitatelawfulactsinrelationtoTPM-protectedworks.Reichmanandhisco-authorssuggesta "reverse notice-and-takedown" regime which operates on a similar premise: "users would be abletogivecopyrightownersnoticeoftheirdesiretomakepublicinterestusesoftechnically protectedcopyrightedworks,andrightholderswouldhavetheresponsibilitytotakedownthe TPMsorotherwiseenabletheselawfuluses" (Reichmanetal.,2007,p.985) . 72 Suchasystem mustmakeprovisionforsituationswhereownersdonottakeadequatestepstomakethework availablewithinareasonabletime,orwhereusershaveprivacyorotherconcernsthatmakeit unreasonable to expect them to request assistance from the copyright owner. There are various options at this stage, none of which is, admittedly, ideal. It may not be sufficient to permit a would-be user to initiate a legal action before the court, or to instigate formal arbitrationormediationproceedings,particularlyifreliefislimitedtothespecificpartyseeking it.AlessonerousorcostlyrouteshouldbefoundifthegoalistopreventTPMsfromunduly inhibitinglawfuluses. Anappropriatemechanismfortheenforcementofexceptionsmayrequiretheidentificationof anintermediarybodyorbodiestofacilitatefairdealingsandpermittedacts.Oneapproachmay be simply to require unencrypted copies of works to be lodged at certain public institutions (libraries, educational institutions, etc.) either on request or by legal mandate. Under such a scheme, notice requirements on protected copies could indicate the sources of TPM-free versions. 73 Alternatively, an intermediary could be entrusted with providing circumvention servicesordevicesonrequest,whichwouldyieldtraceablecopiesofprotectedworks.Inone version of this model, the assigned body would perform a gatekeeper role with the responsibility of making initial determinations as to the merit of applicants' claims; another versionwouldreducethisroletoamerelyministerialonewherebycircumventionservicesand deviceswouldbeautomaticallydistributedinresponsetorecordedrequests (Besek,2004,pp. 494-5 independent third party institution would be responsible for providing digital keys to beneficiaries of copyright limitations (Burk and Cohen, 2001) . In order to best replicate traditionalfairusepractices,BurkandCohenenvisageasimpleonlineapplicationprocedure, withkeysbeingprovidedonrequestwithoutassessmentofthelawfulnessofdealings,andwith anyrecordsbeingsubjecttostrictprivacyconditions.Amiddleroadcouldseetheintermediary charged with responsibility for obtaining declarations of lawful use from applicants, and ensuring only that such declarations meet applicable statutory requirements. The declaration could be required to contain, for example, identification, a statement of qualified status, and thespecificexemptionsofwhichthepartyintendstotakeadvantage (Besek,2004pp.495-6 ). 74 The development of an appropriate lawful use infrastructure is a complicated proposition fraughtwithproblemsofbothpracticalityandprinciple.Difficultquestionswouldsurroundthe identificationofappropriateintermediariesor"qualified"personsorinstitutionstotakeonthe "gatekeeper" function. To encumber existing public institutions such as libraries, archives or educationalestablishmentswiththisadditionalresponsibilitymaynotbeappropriateorviable, particularly if the intermediary function is to demand some degree of legal and/or technical expertise. It may require the creation of a new administrative agency, such as that recently constitutedinFrance,ortheassignationofnewpowersandresponsibilitiestoanexistingbody suchastheCopyrightBoard,forexample.Inanycase,theinitialandongoingoperationalcosts couldbesubstantial.Thereisalsotheveryrealriskthatsuchinfrastructuralcostscouldprove unwarranted, either because the system fails to adequately stem the flow of unauthorized copies,orbecausechangesinmarketpracticesquicklyrenderitredundant. Fromaprincipledperspective,theidentificationoftoofeworthewrongintermediariescould result in a "centralization of copyright limitations where only a few actors determine who benefitsfromsuchlimitations,andforwhatpurpose" (Bechtold,2004,pp.376) .Inaddition,a system that requires users to identify themselves and their intended activities in order to benefit from exceptions inevitably raises significant privacy concerns that would have to be overcome (BurkandCohen,2001,pp.63-5) .Perhapsmostfundamentally,however,itisallbut impossible to conceive of a lawful use mechanism that does not have a chilling effect on fair dealing practices by increasing user transaction costs and inhibiting spontaneous uses. Traditionally, users have been able to "use now, litigate later"; TPM protection offers preemptive control to owners, forcing would-be users to "stop now, establish the right-to-use later."Thepriorrestraintsimposedbytechnicalbarriersundercuttheagencyandautonomyof users (Gillepsie,2007,pp.255-61) ,ensuringthateventhebestexamplesofanti-circumvention legislationfailtogiveeffecttothesubtletiesandfluiditiesofcreativeplay. Inlightoftheseconcerns,anynewanti-circumventionregimemustincorporatetoolstopermit continuous monitoring of its application and effects on user practices. Procedures should be put in place to ensure the systematic identification and assessment of the impact of TPM protection (Gasser,2006,pp.104-5 C.DIGITALLOCKSANDTHELIMITSOFPRESCRIPTIVEPARALLELISM Whatever legal framework emerges from the digital copyright reform process, however, the problemsandimplicationsofTPMsarelikelytobemorefar-reachingandintractablethatthese proposedlegislative"solutions"mayintimate.Afterall,simplytoacceptthelogicofadditional legalprotectionforTPMsistoacceptthattheuseofTPMsshouldbesupported(inthesenseof being both encouraged and strengthened), and so to concede a role for digital locks in our copyright system. And so it would be remiss to conclude without highlighting a few "bigger picture"considerationsthatunderscoretherisksandpotentialimpactofsuchaconcession. First,weshouldbeawareoftheriskthatthelegalprotectionofTPMswillshoreuptherightsof existingownersandgenerallymaintainthestatusquoformanyofthepowerfulindustryactors presentlypushingforlegislativereform.Thecreationofanti-circumventionrightsrespondsto the perceived threats posed by networked technologies, with stronger entitlements intended to guarantee a foothold for existing stakeholders in emergent markets (Ganley, year, p. 55) . Anti-circumvention laws may therefore have an entrenchment effect, with the possible consequence of prematurely foreclosing the emergence of new industry actors and the evolution of new models or avenues of dissemination. 75 While it is self-evident that existing industrystakeholderswouldhopetoachievesuchentrenchment,itisbynomeansclearthat policy-makers should share this goal. To the extent that policy-makers adopt the defensive posture of rightholders and established industry actors, they risk circumscribing the creative, democraticandparticipatoryopportunitiesthatthesetechnologiespresentforsocietyatlarge. And if TPM protection appears necessary to strengthen the control offered by existing copyright law, we should consider the further risk that the creation of new rights will only obfuscatethemorefundamentalfailingsofcopyrightinournetworkedsociety.Proponentsof anti-circumvention legislation frequently point to massive increase and pervasiveness of copyright infringing activities amongst members of the general public as support for TPM protection. We must, however, take care not to bandage over wounds that are in need of properattention.Thepervasivenessofend-userinfringementspointstoagrowingdisconnect between social norms (old and emerging) and legal norms (traditional and proposed). This increasinglychasmicdividesuggestsanevengreatercauseforconcern:namely,thechanging role and relevance of copyright law in everyday cultural exchange and creative play, and the wayinwhichthischallengesthenormativefoundationsofthecopyrightsystem.Strengthening existing laws and enacting new ones is potentially a quick but fleeting fix to a larger socionormativequandary.Whereestablishedandemerginguserpracticeschallengethecoherence of social and legal norms, the latter become increasingly costly and difficult to enforce. The impositionoflegalnormsthatarenotsufficientlyinternalizedbymanyormostcitizenscould threaten the perceived legitimacy of the copyright system, and compromise the rule of law moregenerally (Gervais,2005,pp.48-53) . 76 This TotheextentthatTPMsarelaudedaspracticalmeansby which to ameliorate these problems, we should ask whether they are problems that need solving. If copyright were to operate in practice in perfect harmony with copyright law as it existsonthebook,thesystemwouldbefarfromperfect:becausecopyrightasasystemworks better when it "leaks," perfect control is a fallacious ideal. 77 Similarly, the ambiguity of legal doctrinessuchasfairdealingisnotaflawbutavitalfeatureofthesystem.Theboundariesof fairdealingarefluid,itsapplicationcontext-specific,anditsscopesubjecttointerpretation:asa result,manyuseswillberoutinelyundertakenandremainun-litigatedbecausetheybelongin the penumbra of doubt that makes them possibly fair-and possibly infringing (see Gillepsie, 2007,p.59) .BroadTPMprotectionswillpermittheindeterminacyoflegaldoctrine-whichhas been so central to the preservation of breathing space for fair dealing practices-to be supplantedbythedeterminacyoftechnology. Although better control does not necessarily make a better system, the quest for perfect controlfindslegitimationintheproprietaryrhetoricofintellectualproperty.Thus,forexample, protectedcontentiscastasprivateproperty,andthecircumventionofTPMsisequatedwith breaking and entering: it is no more permissible, according to some proponents of anticircumventionlaw,tocircumventaTPMtoexerciseapermittedact,thanitistobreakintoa cartomakefairuseofamanuscriptleftinside.Witheverysuchanalogy,acounter-analogycan befound:itisnomorepermissible,onemightsay,toemployTPMstoprohibitaccesstolawful usersthanitistoerectfencesaroundpublicland.Theinappropriateextensionanduseofsuch metaphorscanobscurequestionableassumptionsandunsubstantiatedclaims,ascanreliance onpurportedparallelswithoutadequatedistinctionsbeingdrawn. 78 Andso,finally,thereisthe risk that added protection for TPMs will further entrench the misleading proprietary rhetoric thathaspervadedtheTPMdebate,andlendweighttotheperceptionofintellectualproperty as absolute dominion (Ganley, 2006, p. 56) . It is crucial that we identify and challenge the expansion(andfrequentmisapplication)ofpropertyrhetoricthathasandwillaccompanynew claims to right, and avoid the muddied moralistic reasoning that such rhetoric is intended to evoke.Thevalidityofclaimsandtheirpolicyrationalesshouldbeassessedontheirownterms andwiththepublicpolicygoalsofthecopyrightsystemclearlyinview.
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VI.CONCLUSION
Canadian policy makers continue to contemplate the appropriate design for a new layer of rightsthatwillaffordgreaterprotectiontoownersinthedigitalenvironment.Inmyopinion, theclearestroutetowardsretainingroughlythesamebalancebetweencopyrightownersand users in this new environment would be, first, to refrain from creating anti-circumvention rights,andsecond,toestablishaneffectivesystemtofacilitatelawfulactsinrelationtoTPMprotected works. The latter would require the enactment of a positive obligation for rightholders to provide the necessary means for users to take advantage of recognized exceptions, and would benefit from the creation of an intermediary body to receive user requests and distribute circumvention devices or services or TPM-free copies. Under such a model,ownerswouldcontinuetoenjoytheadvantagesoftechnicalmeasurestoreinforcetheir practical control over legally protected works, while users would be both practically able and legallyentitledtomakelawfulusesoftheseworks. Ifanti-circumventionrightsaretobecreated,however,Ihavesuggestedthatitmaybepossible to substantially meet the principled demands of prescriptive parallelism by carefully constructingtheserightsaroundtheexistingcorner-stonesofCanadiancopyrightpolicy.These rights should, for example, be made contingent on certain formalities or guarantees; directly tiedtocopyrightinfringingactivitiessothatcircumventionfornon-infringingpurposesremains lawful;restrictedtocircumventionactivitiessothatcircumventiontechnologiesarenotperse restricted;madesubjecttobroadandexplicitfairandlawfuluseexceptions;andconditionalon accessible mechanisms to ensure the practical availability of these exceptions. To the extent thatsuchproposalssoundunwieldy,thisshouldbeheardasacautionarynotenotagainstthe requirements and limits described, but rather against any legislative intervention to reinforce TPMsthroughthecopyrightsystem. While an ideal solution to the challenge of preserving the copyright balance remains elusive, canvassing these possibilities reveals one thing with certainty: the anti-circumvention provisionsofBillC-61werefarfromanidealsolution.Canada'scopyrightbalanceofrightsand exceptionswillbepreservedinthedigitalenvironmentonlybyresistingexternalpressures,by identifying and learning from best and worst practices in other jurisdictions, and most importantly, by taking seriously the centrality of fair dealing and the public domain within copyrightlaw. Whateverbroadprinciplesandpoliciesmayultimatelyinformtheshapeofanti-circumvention regulations, it should be borne in mind that, fundamentally, TPMs confer primacy to private ordering.Whileproponentsofanti-circumventionlawshave"takencoverundertheumbrella ofcopyrightrhetoric" (Gillepsie,2007,p.274) ,thelegalprotectionofTPMswillprivilegeprivate effortstocontrolaccess,distribution,useandconsumptionofdigitalcontent,marginalizingthe public interest and social welfare considerations that have informed the development of the copyrightsystemanditsdelicatebalance.TheproliferationofTPMsisalteringthewayinwhich weexperienceandengagewithculturalresourcesinournetworkedsociety-butanewlayerof legalentitlementattachedtoTPMswouldaltertherolethatcopyrightplaysinregulatingour culturallife. Fromasocio-culturalperspective,thelargerthreatsoreadilyobscuredbypracticalpleasand political arguments is that, through a combination of technical pragmatism and misguided policy, we fail to realize the full benefits and potential (fulfill the promise, if you will) of the digital era. CitingGeist(2006,p.9) ,theminorityjudgmentcontinues:"TheInternetandnewtechnologies haveunleashedaremarkablearrayofnewcreativity,empoweringmillionsofindividualstodo more than just consume our culture, instead enabling them to actively and meaningfully participateinit."
81 Suchstatementsseemtoholdpromiseofacopyrightsystemthatrespects and reflects the transformative possibilities of new technologies rather than resisting and constraining the emerging cultural practices that these technologies permit. 82 As we consider reforming our copyright laws in response to the digital shift, we should be committed to realizingthispromise.
Notes
The author wishes to thank the organizers of the University of Toronto 2009 Copyright Symposium (part of the Centre for Innovation Law & Policy's Microsoft Information Society Project). In particular, thanks go to Abraham Drassinower and Andrea Slane for the opportunity to participate, and to Richard Owens for his challenging counter-arguments. A debt of gratitude is also owed to Tamsin Thomas for her research and editorial assistance.
1 This is an important conceptual distinction, if not always a practical one. As Kerr and his co-authors (2002-2003, p. 13) explain, in reality, TPMs often display use control and access control characteristics, making the distinction difficult to maintain, and complicating any effort to legislate activities in relation to one kind of TPM and not the other. 2 Notably, the Canadian copyright balance, as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Théberge v Galerie d 'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. 2002 SCC 34 (Théberge) , preserves, as an equal and distinct objective, providing a just reward for authors. I have argued elsewhere that the provision of individual reward can and should be subsumed within the general public goal of encouraging the creation and dissemination of intellectual works (see Craig, 2002 ), but such a conclusion is not necessary to support the argument advanced here. 3 The teleological argument that underlies the demands for stronger legal rights is neatly articulated by James Boyle: "[T]he strength of intellectual property rights must vary inversely with the cost of copying," from which it appears to follow that "as copying costs approach zero, intellectual property rights must approach perfect control" (2008, pp. 60-1) . 4 The Working Group reasoned:
[L]egal protection alone will not be adequate to provide incentive to authors to create and to disseminate works to the public. Similarly, technological protection likely will not be effective unless the law also provides some protection for the technological processes and systems used to prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. The Working Group finds that prohibition of devices, products, components and services that defeat technological methods of preventing unauthorized use is in the public interest and furthers the Constitutional purpose of copyright laws (White Paper, 1995, p. 230, emphasis added). 5 WIPO treaties (1996) [online] . Available at <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html> and <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html> [Accessed on October 2009]. 6 A striking example is the elimination of a draft article that would have recognized a right of copyright owners to control temporary reproductions of their work in a computer's RAM. 7 For a detailed account of the US agenda at WIPO and its impact on the resulting treaties, see Samuelson (1997) . With regard to the regulation of circumvention technologies specifically, see Litman (2001, pp. 129-33 The effect of signature is not, as one might expect, to bind a state to the terms of a treaty.… A state that has signed, but not yet ratified, a treaty is bound not to do anything contrary to the objects and purposes of that treaty prior to ratification or withdrawal of signature. However, a state is not bound to follow the terms of a treaty in their entirety until ratification (2002). 12 The text continues: "the ratification process would only be considered after further work has been completed. " See Government of Canada (2008a) . 13 Not everyone is a critic of such a development, however. See, e.g. Bell (1998) . 14 See Ginsburg (2001) :
The 'copyright balance' is hardly immutable… It is far from apparent why the 'balance' in force from the advent of [mass market copying] devices should be more normative and less contingent that the prior 'balance,' or than the now emerging balance (p. 5).Notably, Ginsburg does not present the access-right as a wholly new creation of the digital era, but rather suggests that it was arguably "implicit in the reproduction and distribution rights under copyright in the days before mass copying devices. The copyright owner controlled access by choosing how to make the work available. There are therefore three hurdles to be met by a defendant who claims to have dealt fairly with a work: first, the purpose must be one of those listed in the Act; second, the dealing must be fair; and finally, sufficient acknowledgement must have been given where statutorily required. 20 "[T]he purpose of copyright law was to balance the public interest in promoting the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator" (CCH, supra note 16, paragraph 23). 21 The Court allowed the defendant Library to claim a "research" purpose in the provision of copying services to its patrons. In recognition of the public purposes of the Copyright Act, the Court opined that a more inclusive approach to applying the fair dealing defence was necessary. 22 In order to be fair, a dealing must be for the purpose of research, private study, news reporting, criticism or review; and it must be "fair", which is "a question of fact and depends on the facts of each case" (CCH, supra note 16, paragraph 52). Although there is no "set test," determinations of fairness involve consideration of several factors, which may include (1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work (ibid., paragraph 53 The Internet has threatened the ability of rights holders to prevent the unauthorized use of works and other protected subject matter. People around the world have taken advantage of the Internet to access content that is available in user-friendly forms. This access is often made through new legitimate services and platforms, and also via free alternatives, both legitimate and illegitimate, to the traditional channels of distribution of copyright material. See also Barry B. Sookman (2005) : "TPM's are essential to limiting the ease of carrying out copyright infringement in the digital environment. Without adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of TPMs, [the] goals [of Canadian copyright policy] will be undermined" (p. 26). 28 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson (1999) :
Clinton Administration officials, bowing to the wishes of Hollywood and its allies, opted…to support an unpredictable, overborad, and maximalist set of anti-circumvention regulations…. It was, in short, not the needs of the digital economy that drove adoption of the anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA. Rather, what drove the debate was high rhetoric, exaggerated claims, and power politics from representatives of certain established but frightened copyright industries (p. 533). 29 While 1201(a)(2) prohibits trafficking in devices that circumvent access controls, 1201(b) prohibits trafficking in circumvention devices designed or produced to circumvent TPMs that protect the exclusive rights of copyright holders in the Copyright Act (e.g. those measures that copyright owners employ to prevent unauthorized reproduction of the work). 30 Samuelson (1999) argues that "the enumerated exceptions in the act-of-circumvention ban are unduly narrow and inconsistent with framework principles" (pp. 537-46). 31 The list also includes: circumvention to achieve interoperability of computer programs ( §1201(f)); circumvention to prevent minors from accessing material on the Internet ( §1201(h)); circumvention when either the technical measure or the work collect of disseminate personally identifying information about the user's online activities ( §1201(i)); circumvention to test the security of a computer, computer system, or network ( §1201(j)). Note that only three of these exceptions apply to one or both of the anti-device rules: the exception for reverse engineering may, subject to limitations, permit a person to develop and make available the means of circumventing both accessand rights-control TPMs to achieve interoperability; encryption research and security testing exceptions are, subject to limitations, available for the development and distribution of devices necessary to circumvent access-control measures only. 32 For example, an exemption exists for " [c] omputer programs in the form of firmware that enable wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communication network, when circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communication network." All six exemptions can be found online. Kerr et al. (2002 Kerr et al. ( -2003 In accordance with Article 6(3), the protection encompasses the act of circumvention and trafficking in devices and services both in relation to copyright control measures and access control measures. 40 Reichman et al. identify article 6(4) as "one dimension of parallelism in the EU Directive."
Riechman cites Hugenholtz (2000) : "[Article 6(4)] is presumably intended to reconcile the interests of right owners employing technical protection measures with the interests of users wishing to benefit from copyright limitations" (p. 501) 41 "'Fair use by mandate' describes circumstances in which rightholders are directed to enable noninfringing uses but not necessarily given specific instructions as to how that should be done" (Besek, 2004, p. 492) . 42 See Dusollier (2003) : "Would any measure, even a minimal one, free the State from its legislative duty to safeguard the public interest? If it did, too much unrestrained power would go to authors and other rights holder of copyrighted works" (p. 53). 43 Article 6(4), Copyright Directive, supra note 39. 44 The intended scope of this carve-out is not entirely clear. For example, does an online music store qualify as an interactive on-demand service? See Gasser and Girsberger (2004, p. 25) and Brown and Bohm (2003) (describing this as "a dramatic reduction of copyright users' rights that needs urgent revision in the review of the Directive" [p. 21]); and Dusollier (2003, p. 54) . 45 Included are exceptions concerning: specific reproductive acts by libraries, educational establishments, museums or archives without commercial advantage; certain acts in respect of ephemeral recordings; reproductions of broadcasts by social institutions for non-commercial purposes; certain illustrative uses in teaching or scientific research; certain uses for the benefit of persons with a disability; and certain uses for the purpose of public security. On the apparently arbitrary nature of this selection, see: Institute for Information Law, 2007, p. 110; cited in Reichman et al., 2007 , at note 312; see also Dusollier, 2003 , p. 53. 46 See also Reichman et al. (2007 : " [T] he failure to mandate the adoption of a wide range of exceptions undermines the effectiveness of Article 6(4) in achieving its general goal of prescriptive parallelism" (p. 1043). 47 Compare to Dusollier (2004) : "Behind a balanced, publicly oriented exterior…lies a privateorderings model in which author interests are privileged and preserved" (p. 55). See also Weise (2002):
[T]he Directive permits a scenario where there is virtually nothing left of the traditional copyright balance: a world where fair use rights are dead since most circumvention acts and all circumvention devices are prohibited; a world where copyright law would be replaced by technological monopolies and electronic contracts (p. 151). 48 Section 374(3) of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act states that beneficiaries of exceptions "may apply to the High Court for an order requiring a person to do or to refrain from doing anything the doing or refraining from doing of which is necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of this section" (cited in Gasser, 2004, p. 79 
